Samuel Press
As NATO leaders convene in The Hague from June 24-26, 2025, the Alliance faces a moment of hard choices and historic opportunity. The summit is not only about reaffirming unity—it is about redefining the very nature of Western security in an age of fractured geopolitics. With NATO’s proposed 5% GDP defense target on the table, Canada deepening its strategic ties with Europe, and the unpredictable arc of post-Putin Russia looming, Washington must lead with clarity, consistency, and strategic purpose. All of this unfolds against the backdrop of President Trump’s second term and a divided U.S. Congress grappling with the implications of global instability, growing defense obligations, and the limits of American patience with its allies.
The Hague Summit marks a critical departure from past Alliance gatherings. The traditional consensus around shared values is giving way to difficult debates over capability, credibility, and contribution. The proposal to raise NATO members’ defense spending to 5% of GDP signals a new phase of realism within the Alliance. No longer is the 2% benchmark considered sufficient. The security environment—defined by Russian aggression, Chinese strategic expansion, cyber escalation, and growing instability in the Middle East and Sahel—demands a comprehensive and durable response.
The 5% target, proposed by Secretary General Mark Rutte and backed by Washington, is ambitious. It divides into 3.5% for conventional capabilities and 1.5% for infrastructure, cyber resilience, and technological modernization. While this framework reflects the multidimensional nature of modern deterrence, it also exposes longstanding fractures within the Alliance—especially between rhetoric and readiness.
In Washington, President Trump has used the summit to reaffirm his position that NATO members must pay more—or risk diminished U.S. support. His administration is considering a defense burden-sharing bill in Congress that would tie American troop deployments to allied spending levels. Though controversial, the move has gained traction among fiscal conservatives and segments of the national security establishment, who argue that American taxpayers should no longer subsidize European security indefinitely.
Among America’s closest allies,Canada’s trajectory is of particular strategic interest. Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Ottawa has begun quietly reorienting its defense posture. This includes formal interest in joining the EU’s Re Arm Europe initiative, a move that would tie Canada more closely to European industrial, procurement, and operational planning.
This pivot is not a rejection of North American defense cooperation, but rather a recognition that relying solely on U.S. platforms and political constancy may no longer be sustainable. Canadian defense spending, currently around 1.4% of GDP, remains below even the original NATO benchmark. Yet Ottawa’s ambitions are rising—military deployments in Latvia, investment in Arctic surveillance, and its growing voice in European defense circles are evidence of a middle power seeking strategic leverage.
President Trump, who has at time smocked Canada’s defense contributions and floated the idea of incorporating Canada into a U.S. missile shield or even as a “51st state,” has responded to Ottawa’s pivot with rhetorical skepticism. Behind closed doors, however, administration officials are watching Canada’s European realignment with concern—and quiet approval—so long as it results in tangible military outputs and less reliance on American backstopping.
No issue casts a longer shadow over the NATO summit than the future of Russia. While Western focus has long centered on deterring Putin’s aggression, the Alliance is now confronting the deeper challenge of managing Russia’s potential post-Putin transition. Whether Putin exits power in an orderly succession, through internal instability, or amid geopolitical miscalculation, the risks to European security will intensify.
American intelligence agencies have briefed NATO leaders on multiple Russian scenarios, including escalated pressure on the Baltic states, increased hybrid operations in NATO’s southern flank, and disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening Western political resolve. For the United States, maintaining a credible forward posture inEurope is essential—but so is ensuring that allies, including Canada, are prepared to hold key terrain, share intelligence burdens, and respond decisively to instability in Eastern Europe.
In this context, Canada’s deployments in the Baltics and potential role in a European rapid reaction force offer a valuable complement to U.S. strategic planning. Yet as Washington focuses on Asia and the Pacific, it will demand greater allied responsibility in Europe’s defense—not as a favor, but as a requirement.
Back in Washington, the foreign policy consensus is fraying. President Trump’s administration has adopted a transactional approach to NATO, measuring alliances in cost-benefit terms. His recent remarks—suggesting that the U.S. might “rethink” its commitments to allies who fail to meet defense targets—have stirred anxiety in Brussels and Ottawa.
Congress, meanwhile, remains deeply divided. The Senate Armed Services Committee has advanced a proposal linking defense cooperation to spending benchmarks, while a bipartisan group in the House is pushing back, citing the need to preserve unity in the face of Russian aggression and Chinese expansion. Defense hawks support Trump’s emphasis on cost-sharing but warn that abrupt disengagement could destabilize Europe and erode U.S. credibility.
Still, there is alignment on a central point: the status quo is no longer sustainable. American voters, weary of forever wars and rising deficits, expect allies to do more. The 5% spending target, while aspirational, is viewed by many on Capitol Hill as a necessary forcing mechanism to bring long-overdue change.
The 2025 NATO Summit is not a ceremonial gathering. It is a strategic negotiation. The United States remains the Alliance’s cornerstone—but it is no longer willing to be its crutch. If Canada seeks greater strategic agency through Europe, Washington will support it—so long as it comes with capabilities, not just coordination. If Europe wants security guarantees, the cost will now be shared more equitably and visibly.
There is no returning to the NATO of the past. What lies ahead is a more complex, multipolar, and contested security environment. The 5% commitment, Canada’s realignment, and the Russia question are not isolated developments—they are signals of a fundamental reshaping of the transatlantic compact.
The question now is whether NATO, under U.S. leadership, can move from symbolic unity to operational solidarity. That will depend not only on what is agreed in The Hague, but on what is funded, deployed, and defended in the months and years that follow. The post-Cold War model has expired. What replaces it must be rooted in realism, reciprocity, and resolve.
